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Abstract: Nigeria, under Murtala/Obasanjo regime was widely acknowledged to have adopted 
an overtly active foreign policy toward the rest of Africa, and particularly, South Africa‟s 
apartheid regime, which was in tandem with her Afro-centric posturing at the time. This 
multilateral cum bilateral diplomatic relations earned Nigeria the status of a „frontline state‟ and 
wider recognition at other multilateral levels, but much animosity from the West. South Africa, 
under Mbeki regime was acknowledged to have adopted an overtly active foreign policy relation 
toward the rest of Africa, but covert diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe, which was in tandem 
with her African-renaissance posturing at the time. This multilateral cum bilateral diplomatic 
relations earned South Africa the status of a „backline state‟ and further diminution at the global 
stage. Nigeria and South Africa are arguably perceived as regional hegemons in Africa, whose 
national interest vacillate between cooperation and conflict. The fate of contemporary Africa, 
however, rest on the convergence of these ambivalence of interests. The work adopts the realist 
framework of analysis to interrogate the permutations of Nigeria and South Africa diplomatic 
trajectories at the periods under investigation. Furthermore, comparative analysis is applied to 
the discourse with a view to placing the analysis within theoretical context. The understanding of 
the diplomatic calculations that governed these two eras and their implications for contemporary 
Nigeria/South Africa relations vis-a-vis African politics is instrumental. Ultimately, the fact that 
these diplomatic permutations played out within the context of the international economic 
capitalism makes the analysis more interesting.   
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INTRODUCTION  
Nigeria and South Africa are two 
potential giants and powerful African 
states. Both are uniquely located 
within Africa to respond to the 
global challenges that are unfolding 
for the continent in the new century. 
The tremendous phenomenal 
changes that started evolving in the 
global system since the beginning of 
the 1990s, including the 
democratization process that 
commenced in the South African 
racist enclave, have had a significant 
bearing on relations between the two 
countries and constitute a watershed 
for bilateral relations between them. 
This consciousness is jointly shared 
by the two countries and has 
continually defined and redefined 
their relationships within the global 
politics (Onimode, 1999). 
  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research adopts a critical 
conversational method which 
involves literature review, histo-
empirical analysis, critical 
conceptual clarification and analysis. 
As a way of exhausting the content 
of this research topic, the literature 
review affords us the opportunity of 
laying bare the concepts of 
Megaphone diplomacy and Quiet 
diplomacy of the two countries 
within the purview of our intellectual 
interrogation. The histo-empirical 
analysis affords us the opportunity of 
grounding this discourse on the 
empirical facts surrounding the 
foreign policies of these two 
countries rather than mere abstract 
pontifications. Critical conceptual 
clarification and analysis is 
necessary in ensuring that we do not 
escape into the world intellectual 
irresponsibility by disengaging those 
that are not familiar with issues in 
Political Science and International 
Relations. Thus, there will be clear 
clarifications of the concepts that 
formed the bases of our discourse. In 
other words, this research adopts a 
qualitative method relying mainly on 
secondary data. 
 
NIGERIA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA: A CRITICAL 
DISCOURSE   
Since its independence in 1960, 
Nigeria has been in the forefront of 
African and global politics. 
Although, the country initially tried 
to maintain an independent identity, 
it did not pursue an independent 
course. Rather, it was actively 
pursuing a pro-Western policy 
especially during the First Republic 
(1960-1966). All that changed, 
during consequent events in global 
politics that demanded a more 
assertive role for Nigeria, in 
liberating other African countries 
from the clutches of colonialism and 
white supremacist regimes. This 
redefinition of roles by Nigeria in 
African politics was clearly marked 
by the posturing and perceptions of 
the successive military regimes 
which had wrested power from the 
more conservative regimes of the 
immediate post-independent era. 
Thus, Nigeria‟s perception as the 
„giant‟ of Africa and its almost 
altruistic commitment to the growth, 
development, peace and security of 
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the African States conferred on her a 
leadership position in Africa (Ogwu, 
1999).  
 
In essence, among the military 
regimes which held power at the 
period of decolonisation, the most 
active was the Murtala-Obasanjo 
regime of the 1966-1970. In driving 
the course of decolonization, the 
Murtala-Obsanjo regime did not 
involve in rhetoric, but actually 
deployed all military and diplomatic 
arsenal at the disposal of the state to 
thwart the anti-decolonisation 
policies of the west and secure 
independence for Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) and Namibia, while 
placing the issue of South Africa‟s 
apartheid on the international 
agenda. According to Joseph Garba, 
the primacy of apartheid on the 
foreign policy agenda under 
Murtala/Obasanjo could not be 
overemphasized. He argued thus: 
  
No other foreign policy issue 
has pre-occupied Nigerian 
governments more since our 
independence in 1960. 
Nigeria has made friends with 
countries with whom she has 
nothing in common; she has 
conversely made enemies of 
erstwhile friends- all on 
account of their attitude 
towards the South African 
question. We have formulated 
economic policies that have 
sometimes been detrimental 
to our own development 
because of our commitment to 
the eradication of apartheid 
(Garba, 1987:101).  
 
The commitment to the course of the 
liberation of South Africa, earned 
Nigeria the status of a front-line 
state, even though she shares no 
geographical proximity with the 
South African region (Ogunsanwo, 
1986; Akinboye, 2013) and 
consequently, commendations at 
multilateral stages. Paradoxically, 
the gains in the decolonisation 
process engendered by Nigeria 
through her active Afro-centrism 
earned her much hatred from the 
west leading to strains in her foreign 
policy relations with the latter.     
 
The extent of South Africa‟s 
influence and involvement in Africa 
and global politics is comparatively 
less than that of Nigeria. This is 
understandable. For several years, 
South Africa was a pariah state due 
to its apartheid system. The 
obnoxious policy had been in place 
for over four decades. It remained in 
existence until the early 1990s when 
a process of democratisation was 
initiated by the last apartheid 
President, Fredrick de Klerk, and the 
country began to parley with other 
states in the global system 
(Akinboye, 2005). However, since 
the dismantlement of apartheid and 
entrenchment of a democratic setting 
in 1994, South Africa has been fully 
engaged in African and global 
affairs. The successive regimes in 
South Africa have been instrumental 
in the more robust activities of the 
African Union (A.U), 
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Commonwealth of Nations and the 
United Nations (U.N). The post 
apartheid South Africa has 
continually asserted their hegemonic 
influence within the Southern 
African Development Community 
(SADC), participating actively in 
peace keeping efforts, especially in 
Burundi and Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) (Alao, 1998; Pfister, 
2000; Habib, 2008). 
 
The active and influential personality 
of Thabo Mbeki, who succeeded 
Nelson Mandela as the second 
president of the post-apartheid South 
Africa best exemplifies the tempo 
characteristic of the post-apartheid 
foreign policy of South Africa. Some 
scholars have recognised the unique 
challenges facing the immediate 
post-apartheid South Africa such as 
democratic consolidation, socio-
economic disparity, rampaging 
effects of HIV/AIDS, land-based 
issues, gender-based divisions, and 
deep racial cleavages; which 
understandably occupied the 
attention of the Nelson Mandela 
administration and which also 
informed the defensive foreign 
policy of his regime (Ala, 2003; 
Landsberg, 2005; Mazrui, 2006).  
 
But following Thabo Mbeki‟s 
coming in 1999 as the successor to 
Nelson Mandela; he chose instead to 
actively and dominantly stamp South 
Africa‟s foreign policy on a regional 
and global stage. With deft 
diplomatic collaboration with 
Obasanjo‟s Nigeria and Wade‟s 
Senegal, Mbeki was able to initiate 
the birth of New Partnership for 
Africa‟s Development (NEPAD), 
which consequently led to the 
transformation of Organisation of 
Africa‟s Unity (OAU) to AU in 
2002. In view of these bilateral cum 
multilateral moves, Mbeki left no 
one in doubt about his government‟s 
determination to jettison the 
conservative and defensive 
diplomatic approach of his 
predecessor (Adebajo and 
Landsberg, 2003).  
 
It therefore, came as a surprise to the 
international community to notice 
the conservative approach with 
which South Africa treated her 
bilateral relations with Zimbabwe on 
the heels of the legitimacy question 
in the latter. A number of conjectures 
have been postulated by theorists and 
analysts to explain the bilateral 
trajectories of South Africa‟s Mbeki 
and Zimbabwe‟s Mugabe, which 
incidentally are not within the 
confines of this paper. But it is 
important to observe that the 
continual defiance of the 
international outcry against the 
leadership crisis in Zimbabwe on the 
heels of the post-election crisis 
earned South Africa massive 
condemnation in the international 
community, leaving Mbeki with 
credibility questions, copiously 
painted by the west. As earlier 
mentioned in the abstract, the 
patronising approach of Mbeki to the 
Zimbabwe question may not be un-
connected to his African-renaissance 
philosophy which dotted every line 
in his foreign policy agenda 
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(Landsberg, 2003, Chikane, 2012; 
Chikane, 2013).  
 
It is against this background that this 
paper interrogates the issues 
involved in the two eras under 
investigation and their implications 
for Africa‟s development. The issues 
are placed within the context of the 
international capitalist environment 
within which the regimes operated. 
After the introductory part of this 
paper, the second section 
conceptualises realism as a 
theoretical approach in diplomacy. 
Following in the third section, the 
Murtala-Obasanjo regime is 
highlighted with special emphasis on 
the activism that informed the mega-
phone diplomacy of the era. The 
fourth section interrogates the 
conservatism that characterised the 
quiet diplomacy of Mbeki in 
Zimbabwe. An attempt will be made 
consequently to bridge the gaps in 
analysis by a systematic and 
comparative approach in the fifth 
section. Finally, the concluding 
section wraps up the discourse. 
 
REALISM AND DIPLOMACY: 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
The field of international relations is 
laden with concepts which are best 
described as contentious and worst 
as vague depending on the view 
point of the scholar. This 
problematic usually comes to play in 
an attempt to conceptualise terms in 
the cause of scientific investigations. 
Therefore, defining diplomacy and 
realism will not substantially defer 
from this difficulty in the discipline. 
  
Martin Griffiths, in his attempt to 
deconstruct the concept of realism 
from the traditional polarisation of 
the term, usually when being 
compared to idealism, voiced this 
growing concern in a rather poignant 
way. According to him, one of the 
difficulties of treating realism as 
clear-cut school of thought is that its 
representatives differ vastly in the 
way they use the assumptions which 
are said to define the school in the 
first place. For this and other 
reasons, he argued, there is not even 
a derivative consensus on how to 
define realism beyond a few broad 
assumptions about the importance of 
states as actors, the institutionally 
anarchic environment within which 
states co-exist, and hence the 
importance of power as the master 
variable to explain broad patterns of 
states‟ interactions. He concludes 
that at this level of generality, 
realism is simply a set of 
assumptions about the world rather 
than a particular theory, let alone 
anything so pretentious as a 
scientific paradigm (Griffiths, 1992).  
 
Ultimately, how one understands and 
evaluates realism in international 
relations depends a great deal on 
whether one views it as a 
philosophical disposition, a scientific 
paradigm, a mere framework of 
analysis, a testable explanatory 
theory of international politics, or an 
ideology of great power 
conservatism (op.cit, 1992). Off 
course, there are many other attempts 
to define realism more rigorously 
and narrowly so that it may be 
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compared to and evaluated against 
competing schools of thought. The 
works of Hans Morgenthau 
exemplified the best traditions of 
realism. The core of Morgenthau‟s 
thesis is that realism is based on 
interest defined in terms of power. 
Based on this, he posits that foreign 
policy built on any other thing but 
national interest is bound to fail 
(Morgenthau, 1951).  
 
Realism maintains that universal 
moral principles cannot be applied to 
the actions of states in abstraction, 
but that they must be filtered through 
the concrete circumstances of time 
and space. It believes that the world, 
as imperfect as it is from the rational 
point of view, is the result of forces 
which are inherent in human nature. 
To improve the world, one must 
work with these forces, not against 
them. This being inherently a world 
of opposing interests and of conflict 
among them, moral principles can 
never be fully realised but at best 
approximated through the ever-
temporary balancing of interests and 
the ever-precarious settlement of 
conflicts. It aims at achievement of a 
lesser evil rather than of the absolute 
good (Johari, 2009; 186).    
 
Diplomacy on the other hand has an 
intricate conceptual link with the 
concept of realism. This is not far-
fetched because the traditional 
representatives of countries who are 
diplomats have a primary objective, 
among others which is to protect, 
preserve and project the national 
interest of their countries. Viewed 
from this stand-point, one may, at the 
risk of reaching premature 
conclusion, tie the concept of 
diplomacy to realism in a technical 
sense. In its simplistic analytical 
understanding therefore, diplomacy 
is the planning and management of 
relations between nations by the 
representatives of a country abroad; 
it also means at a lower level, skill or 
art of dealing with people or 
situation (Nwolise, 1998). In 
international affairs, diplomacy 
entails the combination of political 
skills and method, particularly 
negotiation, give and take strategy, 
and subtle threats, for the conduct 
and management of bilateral 
relations between two states and 
multilateral relations among three or 
more states (Akindele, 2007).  
 
At a higher intellectual level 
however, diplomacy can be viewed 
within the context of institutional 
mechanisms for fostering 
international relations through the 
instrumentality of the diversity of 
international actors, having the state 
as the primary actor. According to 
Amstutz, diplomacy can be seen as 
the process by which states and other 
international actors pursue official 
international relations, reconciling 
competing and conflicting interests 
through negotiations (Amstutz, 
1995). Following this 
conceptualisation, it becomes 
important to note at this juncture 
that, with the wave of globalisation 
which has implications for state and 
non-state relations within the larger 
dynamics of the international 
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environment, the field of diplomacy 
cannot be restricted to state actors 
alone, but involves other non-state 
actors, some of which have 
constituted great threats to, indeed, 
subverted the sovereignty of states. 
In essence, the steadily escalating 
tempo of globalisation has 
dramatically and welcomingly added 
value to, as well as increased the 
prominence of, multilateralism as a 
channel for the conduct of modern 
diplomacy, without ignoring 
fundamentally, the historically 
preeminent position of bilateralism 
as an approach to the conduct of 
foreign policy and management of 
the inter-state relations (Akindele, 
2007). 
 
According to Rafiu Akindele, any 
attempt to dichotomize the concepts 
of multilateralism and bilateralism, 
either as competing approaches to or 
as parallel steams in the conduct of 
external relations, quite obviously 
ignores or, at least, trivialises the 
essential linkages and mutual 
interdependence between them. He 
argued that just as the processes of 
multilateral diplomacy that are 
neither prefaced by, nor anchored to, 
a simultaneous series of bilateral 
contacts and consultation among 
nation-states drain themselves of 
creative wisdom and professional 
sagacity essential for diplomatic 
success, the management of bilateral 
diplomatic relations that does not 
take cognisance of the 
interpenetration of multilateralism 
and bilateralism in the conduct of 
foreign policy begins the journey in 
the diplomatic arena with an opaque 
vision, a false start and on the wrong 
foot (Akindele, 2007). This position 
essentially explains why the 
approach in this essay avoids the 
strict bifurcation of these two 
elements of diplomacy in comparing 
the „mega-phone diplomacy‟ of the 
Murtala-Obasanjo regime in Nigeria 
and the „quiet diplomacy‟ of the 
Mbeki administration, but rather is 
geared toward the combination of 
their intricacies to make for a more 
robust analytical framework. 
  
Hans Morgenthau, in what appears to 
be a welding of the bridge that might 
otherwise divide the concepts of 
diplomacy and realism, perceives 
diplomacy as the act of bringing 
different elements of national power 
to bear with maximum effect upon 
those points in international situation 
which concern the national interest 
most directly. In bringing the 
relevance of diplomacy to bear on 
the management of a country‟s 
foreign policy through the projection 
of her national interest, Morgenthau 
asserted that „it is the brain of 
national power, as national morale is 
it soul; if its vision is blurred, its 
judgment defective, and its 
determination feeble, all the 
advantages of geographical location, 
of self-sufficiency in food, raw 
materials, and industrial production, 
of military preparedness, of size and 
quality of population will in the long 
run avail a nation little‟ 
(Morgenthau, 1966).  
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In this context, diplomacy could be 
viewed as the instrument that 
harmonises or synchronises all the 
other components of national power 
of every nation to make it produce 
maximally in her foreign policy 
relations, hence it is safe to 
technically merge the concepts of 
diplomacy and realism within a 
reasonable intellectual limit. By and 
large, if time and history are 
important shapers of diplomatic 
relations, human actors, particularly 
leaders, are the key instrumentalities 
and vehicles through which the 
contours of diplomatic landscape are 
designed, dug and cultivated, or 
truncated (Akindele, 2007).  
It is indeed true, that national 
resource endowment for the conduct 
of foreign policy is a key national 
asset. But arguably as important, if 
not more so, is the use to which 
national resource capacity is put and 
managed by leaders who control the 
affairs of the state at any particular 
time. This poignantly situates the 
context of our analyses to leadership 
styles in the two eras under 
investigation. Put another way, the 
vision and mission of the leadership 
styles of Murtala-Obasanjo of 
Nigeria (1976-1979) and Mbeki of 
South Africa (1999-2008) within the 
organic processes of history best 
explains the policies adopted by 
these leaders and or the outcome of 
such policies. We now turn our 
attention to the regimes under 
investigation.  
 
MURTALA-OBASANJO AND 
NIGERIA’S MEGAPHONE 
DIPLOMACY 
The Murtala/Obasanjo era was 
basically a military regime which 
reflected in the nature and character 
of decision making, especially as it 
related to foreign policy making. The 
style of the administration in 
decision making was that of 
command structure. There was no 
element of bargaining and persuasion 
usually associated with democracy. 
Besides, the policies of Obasanjo 
who succeeded Murtala Muhammed 
was of incremental nature, which 
explains why the period under 
review is generally referred to in 
many literatures as 
Murtala/Obasanjo era (Ajala, 1986; 
Garba, 1987). Nevertheless, the 
Murtala-Obasanjo era in the conduct 
of Nigeria‟s multilateral diplomacy 
has been widely acknowledged as 
the golden era of Nigeria‟s foreign 
policy (Fafowora, 1984; Ajala, 1992; 
Garba, 1987; Saliu, 2006,). It is 
common knowledge that Nigeria‟s 
component of national power with 
careful and skillful combination of 
leadership vision connived to bring 
Nigeria‟s diplomacy of this era into 
international limelight.  
 
The Murtala Muhammed brief but 
exciting government (1975-1976) 
that succeeded the more cautious 
Gowon administration was, right 
from the outset, prepared to take 
radical measures in both the 
domestic and foreign affairs. The 
goal of the administration was the 
total liberation of the continent of 
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Africa from every vestige of 
colonialism, imperialism and racism 
which informed her Afro-centric 
foreign policy. Indeed, Murtala 
sought to move the country‟s foreign 
policy towards a more genuinely 
non-aligned position. The immediate 
demonstration of her determination 
at eradication of all forms of 
discrimination against Africans was 
the authorisation for the opening of 
offices for the freedom fighters in 
Africa in the capital, Lagos, which 
was hitherto an impossible task by 
the preceding administration of 
Gowon. Owing to this, massive 
military, material and money 
supports were granted to the freedom 
fighters in an unprecedented 
dimension (Ajala, 1986).  
 
In any case, the most widely 
acknowledged diplomatic effort of 
this administration was the open 
support and recognition granted to 
the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 
government in Angola against the 
joint coalition of National Front for 
the Liberation of Angola (FLNA) 
and National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) in 
view of the latter‟s alliance with the 
racist regime of South Africa and 
other western powers to mount a 
military operation against the former, 
irrespective of the effort in the offing 
by Nigeria and other African states 
under the instrumentality of the then 
Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) to form a government of 
National Unity in Angola. No doubt, 
this action was hailed in Nigeria as 
singularly the most daring and 
responsible foreign policy decision 
taken by the Nigerian government 
since independence (Ajala, 1986; 
Ajala, 1993; Akinboye, 2013). 
 
The Obasanjo regime (1976-1979) 
which succeeded the Murtala 
administration following the 
assassination of General Murtala in 
an abortive coup attempt, not only 
continued with the laudable policies 
begun by the Murtala administration 
but also adopted an open-door policy 
for African exiles from Southern 
Africa. It also embarked on various 
man-power training programmes in 
Nigeria for people from Southern 
Africa. One of the most laudable 
attempts at institutionalising the 
struggle against apartheid in South 
Africa adopted by the Obasanjo 
regime was the introduction of the 
Southern African Relief Fund 
(SARF) which was officially 
launched in December, 1976 (Garba, 
1987).  
 
Among other objectives, the primary 
aim of the SARF was to generate 
resources to assist the victims of the 
Southern African oppressive policies 
through education, healthcare and 
nutrition, and ultimately to put more 
funds in the hands of the freedom 
fighters to hasten the quick exit of 
the racist regimes in Southern Africa. 
In line with this policy, the Obasanjo 
administration, in a bid to continue 
with the massive decolonisation 
agenda of his predecessor, moved 
swiftly to take advantage of the post-
election dilemma in Rhodesia (now 
    243 
       Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 2, December, 2013.  
 
Zimbabwe), to secure independence 
for the latter. The Obasanjo 
administration, through the 
deployment of appropriate tools of 
diplomacy, by way of nationalisation 
of the British Petroleum share of 
Shell BP in which the British 
government had an interest, 
prompted the Lancaster House 
Constitutional Conference that 
worked out the constitution for an 
independent Zimbabwe. Nigeria 
provided both Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU) and 
Zimbabwe African People‟s Union 
(ZAPU) with substantial sum of 
money in order to fight the pre-
independence elections successfully 
(Ajala, 1986). 
 
However, the most remarkable credit 
to the administration of Obasanjo in 
the fight against racism, and by 
implication, the singular most 
relevant event that stamped the issue 
of racism on the international agenda 
is the initiation of and consequent 
hosting of a World Conference for 
Action Against Apartheid in 1977, 
under the pioneering influence of the 
country‟s long-term chairmanship of 
the UN‟s Special Committee against 
Apartheid. The conference was not 
only a galvanisation, for the first 
time of people at the grassroots from 
United States, Europe and Australia, 
but had in attendance the most vocal 
dignitary-fighters against racism as 
well as the opinion shapers in the 
Nigerian domestic environment 
(Garba, 1987).  
 
Among other immediate and long-
term outcomes of the conference, 
two very significant ones deserve 
attention at this point: one was the 
recommendation to set up the World 
Campaign against Military and 
Nuclear Collaboration with South 
Africa, which helped tremendously 
to curb the military and nuclear 
excesses of the then racist regime in 
South Africa with their international 
military-industrial accomplices; and 
second, was the November, 1977 
Security Council Resolution 418, 
imposing a mandatory embargo on 
the export of arms to South Africa, 
invoking for the first time in this 
context Chapter V11, designating the 
racial situation in South Africa a 
threat to international peace and 
security (Garba, 1987). 
  
Indeed, the basic feature 
characteristic of the Murtala-
Obasanjo regime as enunciated 
above is the dominant trace of 
activism in their bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy through their 
policy of Afro-centrism, without any 
form of contradictions. What became 
evident as well was the antagonism 
and unpopularity attracted by this 
approach especially against the 
western powers, whose interest in the 
African politics was never disguised. 
The struggle was for the soul of the 
African state, even though the human 
elements were at the centre of the 
issues, and the stake was the 
economic determinism of the 
western capitalist ideology prevalent 
in the international economic system.  
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MBEKI AND THE QUIET 
DIPLOMACY IN ZIMBABWE 
At the centre of international 
criticism of South Africa‟s policy 
towards Zimbabwe during the 
administration of Mbeki is its „quite 
diplomacy‟. Quite diplomacy is 
defined as a combination of 
measures that includes behind the 
scene engagements, secret 
negotiations, and subtle coaxing; it 
also comprises the protection of the 
target state from external criticism 
and the provision of a life-line in 
terms of international economic 
relations. This involves, above all, 
personal or direct diplomacy 
between the heads of state or senior 
officials and persistent negotiations, 
yet also leaves the appearance of 
limited action or even inaction (Prys, 
2007; Chikane, 2012). 
  
In the case of Zimbabwe this 
manifested itself by keeping in 
regular contact with President 
Mugabe and by actively assisting the 
Zimbabwean government through 
facilitation of communication 
between the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) and the 
government particularly after the 
failed referendum in 2000, and both 
presidential and parliamentary 
elections.  Also, links with 
international financial institutions 
were encouraged, and Zimbabwean 
acceptance of certain proposal of the 
United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) on land reform 
was generally regarded to be the 
indirect result of South Africa‟s 
diplomatic initiatives (Prys, 2007). 
 
Quiet diplomacy epitomises the 
principle of constructive engagement 
which embodies the foreign policy 
relations between nations that share 
common interest as demonstrated in 
South Africa and Zimbabwe case 
under a common sub-regional 
platform of Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). 
According to Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, 
quiet diplomacy is itemised as non-
coercive diplomatic measures and 
non-violent strategies such as 
international appeals (moral 
persuasion to conflicting parties), 
fact finding missions, observer 
teams, bilateral negotiations, third 
party informal diplomatic 
consultations, track two diplomacy 
(by non-official, non-governmental 
parties), third party mediation, 
conciliatory gestures and economic 
assistance (Wyk, 2002).  
 
In furtherance to the above, South 
Africa also followed development 
and governance approaches such as 
policies to promote national 
economic and social development 
via continued economic trade and 
Zimbabwe‟s economic integration in 
the region as well as recommending 
economic reforms and standards. 
Added to the list is that South Africa 
upheld all bilateral cooperative 
agreements and programmes 
between them and attempted to 
promulgate and enforce human 
rights, democratic and other 
standards via its participation in 
monitoring most of Zimbabwe‟s 
elections (Wyk, 2002).  
  
   245 
 
       Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 2, December, 2013.  
 
The Zimbabwean crisis has its root 
in the agrarian policy or the land 
reform policy of the Robert 
Mugabe‟s administration against the 
western interest in Zimbabwe, but in 
reality the crisis has economic origin 
which dates back to the 1980s. 
During the emerging crisis, 
Zimbabwe nevertheless intervened 
into the war in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) with 
3,000 troops behind President 
Laurent Kabila with further 
devastating consequences for the 
state budget. This intervention was 
largely interpreted to mean an 
attempt by President Mugabe to gain 
influence over DRC‟s wealth of 
natural resources to assist in 
revamping her ailing and moribund 
economy. All these eventually set the 
pace for the grave consequences that 
accompanied the aftermath of the 
presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 2002 and 2005 
respectively, the rise of the MDC, 
led by Prime Minister Morgan 
Tsvangirai as a formidable 
opposition to the government-led 
political party, Zimbabwe African 
National Union- Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF), and the emergence of 
political stalemate that became a 
protracted feature of the 
Zimbabwean political landscape 
until after the slippery political 
compromise that restored a 
semblance of order in the polity 
(Chikane, 2013).  
 
Many literatures have attempted to 
advance the reasons why South 
Africa under Mbeki chose quiet 
diplomacy over other diplomatic 
options in dealing with the 
Zimbabwe situation in which case 
her core values were threatened and 
she risked the loss of reputation at 
the international level. In Miriam 
Pry‟s exposition, she elaborated on 
the reasons behind South Africa‟s 
constructive tie with Zimbabwe 
using three more specific, both 
competing and complementary role 
conceptions or themes of the former, 
which she identified as; first 
misunderstood regional power, 
which contains an element of 
exceptionalism, second, as African 
anti-imperialist state, and third as the 
responsible actor facilitating in both 
Zimbabwe‟s domestic struggles as 
well as its global interaction as 
guarantor against the west (Prys, 
2007). 
  
What this translates to is that South 
Africa‟s role perception in Southern 
Africa and by implication in 
Zimbabwe emphasise the need that 
Zimbabwe is a sovereign country 
and therefore its domestic problems 
need to be solved by Zimbabwean 
themselves; that South Africa, 
especially some powerful elements 
in the African National Congress 
(ANC) sense that there is an 
indication of strong perception of 
racism and neo-imperialism by 
western states in the Zimbabwe 
crisis; and finally, that South Africa 
has the responsibility to assist 
Zimbabwe reconcile her conflicting 
groups within the parameters granted 
her by the latter. The underpinnings 
of the above postulation point very 
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poignantly at the principles of 
partnership, sovereignty and African 
solidarity as characteristic of the 
South Africa constructive 
engagement with Zimbabwe.  
 
According to Linda Freeman, the 
policy inconsistencies that 
characterised the quiet diplomacy of 
Mbeki were more deeply rooted in 
factors order than the above 
sentiments of African solidarity and 
African partnership. Freeman argued 
that the Southern African 
government‟s approach to Zimbabwe 
is rooted in continental ambitions, 
regional interests and national 
imperatives. He argued that one must 
therefore, look beyond an analysis 
which focuses primarily on the 
internal factors which have shaped 
policy to include the Mbeki 
government‟s vision of South Africa 
in Africa and within the changing 
global order (Freeman, 2005).  
 
Continental ambition here connotes 
South Africa‟s increasing inter-
penetration of the African continent 
with her capitalist ambition, re-
enforced by her hegemonic and 
dominant status within the continent. 
The contradiction that has 
continually informed the policies of 
the post-apartheid state of South 
Africa is how to reconcile her 
towering economic status with the 
fears of dominance it is likely to 
engender in her relations with the 
rest of Africa (Alden and Soko, 
2005; Hudson, 2007; Alden and 
Pere, 2009). Hence, in an address to 
the South African parliament in 
2003, Thabo Mbeki stated that he 
wished “to assure our neighbours 
and the peoples of the rest of Africa 
that the government we lead has no 
great power pretentions. We claim 
no right to impose our will on any 
independent country. We will not 
force anything on anybody” (cited in 
Freeman, 2005:13).  
 
The issues of hegemony and 
dominance at the continental levels 
have been posed even more sharply 
at the regional level. There is no 
question that, as the giant among a 
set of significantly smaller states in 
the Southern Africa, South Africa‟s 
pre-eminence continues to be the 
central structural reality in the 
region. Most of the SADC member 
states are dependent on the economic 
structure already built by the defunct 
apartheid South Africa for their 
national economic survival. To this 
end, the reality of their economic tie 
to South Africa will remain a 
significant part of the factor that will 
continue to shape their relationship 
with the country.  
 
Closely allied to these is the national 
imperative of the Mbeki 
administration to remain committed 
to the cause of stabilising the polity 
by tactful prevention of a likely 
influx of her domestic environment 
by any possibility of an implosion in 
the neighbouring Zimbabwe. This 
explains why the Mbeki 
administration steadfastly resisted 
the option of armed invasion or 
forceful removal of the incumbent 
regime in Zimbabwe, but rather 
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continually sought other was of 
peaceful transition of power 
(Freeman, 2005)   
    
The reaction of the opposition forces 
within Zimbabwe, led by MDC 
differ fundamentally from the view-
points expressed above believed to 
be the force behind Mbeki‟s 
constructive engagement with 
Zimbabwe. For the domestic 
opposition, it is precisely such 
questions of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law which 
are central to the crisis in which 
Zimbabwe is foundering. In their 
view, the land reform on which the 
government had embarked was less 
an attempt to right historical wrongs 
than an opportunistic attempt to 
regain popular favour in face of the 
most serious challenge to its power 
since independence. Support for 
Mugabe, according to this school of 
thought, represents a betrayal of 
mass public opinion and backing for 
a regime riddled with venality and 
corruption (Freeman, 2005). To the 
domestic opposition, therefore, to 
jettison the possibility of armed 
invasion in Zimbabwe by South 
African-led force is to tow the path 
of un-patriotism and to postpone the 
evil days ahead.  
        
The reaction of the Western powers, 
if anything to go by, was 
antagonistic to the constructive 
engagement policy of the South 
African government in Zimbabwe. 
The recourse to neo-imperialistic 
agenda by the Mbeki and Mugabe 
governments as the forces behind the 
crisis in Zimbabwe was the greatest 
source of frustration to the west. The 
expectation of the western powers 
was that South Africa would assume 
a more robust leadership role in the 
region where it wields enormous 
political and economic powers. In 
their view, South Africa‟s quiet 
diplomacy is generally considered to 
be a failure. In their reasoning, South 
Africa had made no direct use of its 
potentially hegemonic leverage, had 
applied no sanctions or economic 
screws to enforce rule of law, free 
and fair elections and a commitment 
of human rights in Zimbabwe. To the 
western powers, what quiet 
diplomacy, which they describe as 
hypocritical has achieved is simply 
to buy time for the embattled regime 
of Mugabe to continually plunder the 
people of Zimbabwe and jeopardise 
western interest in the country 
(Chikane, 2013). 
 
The Mbeki government‟s position 
never wavered in the heat and 
pressure of both domestic and 
external attacks. There is no better 
way to represent the Mbeki 
government‟s position than in a 
statement released by Aziz Pahad, a 
government official, in the cause of 
Presidential Debate on South 
Africa‟s Policy in Zimbabwe at the 
South African National Assembly. 
He argued thus; 
 
Once again we have been 
subjected to hysterical 
concerns about our so called 
failure to tackle the 
Zimbabwe issue. We remain 
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convinced that the collapse of 
Zimbabwe will have serious 
implications for the whole 
region and especially South 
Africa. Why would we want 
this to happen? Our quiet 
diplomacy is criticised 
without any credible 
suggestions on what we 
should do more than we are 
doing. Our critics fail to 
explain what „megaphone 
diplomacy‟ has achieved. 
They fail or refuse to 
acknowledge that since the 
politic and economic crisis 
started we have been tirelessly 
engaged in efforts to help the 
Zimbabweans to deal with 
their crisis (Pahad, 2003:8) 
 
RESEARCH RESULT 
 
Nigeria’s Megaphone Diplomacy 
and South Africa’s Quiet 
Diplomacy: Building Conceptual 
Synergy 
The „megaphone diplomacy‟ of the 
Murtala/Obasanjo era in Nigeria‟s 
international politics came in the 
wake of the African decolonisation 
spearheaded by the Nigerian 
government. This was made possible 
by the structure of the Nigerian state 
which was military in orientation. 
Two fundamental forces however, 
coincided to aid the diplomatic 
approach of the Nigerian state during 
the Murtala/Obasanjo era. First was 
the Cold War politics which was 
characterised by unbridled struggle 
for power and influence in Africa by 
the antagonistic blocks of the West 
and the East. The international 
environment was very tense at the 
time as both the East and the West 
were engaged in vile and hostile 
propaganda against each other. Both 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and defunct Warsaw 
military blocs of the West and East 
respectively had been solidified with 
bases in their respective spheres of 
influence; each bloc had imposed 
restrictions on trade between it  and 
its friends on the one hand and its 
opponents on the other. Each bloc 
had embarked on the development of 
nuclear weapons as well as indulged 
extensively in spying against the 
other (Ajala, 1993). 
      
The second factor that aided 
Nigeria‟s „megaphone diplomacy‟ 
during Murtala/Obasanjo era was the 
oil politics that yielded enormous 
resources to the Nigeria state. At the 
time, the clamour and drive for 
alternative sources of energy had not 
assumed an urgent dimension, and 
oil remained the commodity that 
dictated the dynamics of the 
international politics. Indeed, oil 
politics was instrumental to the 
decision by the British government 
under Margaret Thatcher to yield to 
the pressure by the Nigerian state to 
nationalise the former‟s share of the 
British Petroleum (BP) in Nigeria 
and a ten percent cut in oil supply to 
that company in the event of the 
struggle for the independence of 
former Rhodesia (Now Zimbabwe) 
in 1979 (Gambari, 2008; Whiteman, 
2008).  
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No doubt, the double-edged forces of 
cold war politics which permitted 
and tolerated dictatorial tendencies, 
imposed constraints on the limits of 
power in the international system, 
down-played the primacy and 
supremacy of human rights matters, 
and sustained the politics of 
compromise and contention for 
dominant spheres of influence by the 
two ideological blocs on the one 
hand; and oil politics which enjoyed 
international mercantilist monopoly 
of the market forces placed Nigerian 
government in a privileged position 
in international politics and gave her 
the required leverage to dictate 
international political outcomes to a 
large extent.    
  
The „quiet diplomacy‟ of the Mbeki 
administration came in the wake of 
African-renaissance- reawakening of 
the African consciousness in the 
international economic environment, 
spearheaded by the South African 
government. The South African 
government, with her commanding 
heights of economic dominance in 
the African economic mainstream 
had sought through the platform of 
New Partnership for Africa‟s 
Development (NEPAD), to 
reposition Africa in the „New World 
Order‟ for sustainable economic 
development and favourable 
competitive edge among other 
comity of nations. This became 
necessary in view of the mounting 
debt profile of most of the African 
states and the donor-fatigue that had 
set-in in the area of attracting 
Foreign Direct investment, partly 
owing to the attention of the 
international financiers which had 
shifted to the emerging economies of 
Asia. For that to be attained, the 
philosophy of African solidarity, 
partnership and respect for 
sovereignty of countries in Africa 
had to be implemented (Benneh, 
2001; Adebajo and Landsberg, 
2003).  
 
We can also identify two 
fundamental forces or factors that 
appear to have influenced the 
constructive engagement policy of 
Mbeki‟s administration in the 20th 
century politics. The first is the post-
cold war politics which redefined the 
scope of international relations and 
set new standards for international 
businesses, whether state or private 
sector and the second is the 
globalisation politics, a corollary to 
the first, which has both widened the 
opportunities and risks for 
international engagements.  
 
The collapse of communist 
governments in Eastern Europe, 
marked most graphically by the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the 
seeming ascendancy of Western-
style liberal democracy and free-
market economic systems, led to a 
widespread clamour for more open 
political systems and free enterprise. 
During this period, the continuing 
realities of intra-state conflicts, 
increasing poverty, and social 
disintegration ravaging the continent 
of Africa led scholars to suggest that 
the world was headed towards a new 
world disorder. Since this period 
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technically coincided with South 
Africa‟s demolition of apartheid and 
re-institution of her first popular 
democratic transition, she assumed a 
natural leadership position to seek 
for new ways of re-aligning African 
continent to the new international 
realities for maximum benefit. 
Although the first democratic 
government in South Africa, under 
the conservative leadership of 
Nelson Mandela played down on the 
reality of the new international 
environment and the place of South 
Africa in African politics, his 
successor, Mbeki made no 
pretentions about his un-wavering 
willingness to position South Africa 
to assume her rightful place in 
history (Freeman, 2005).  
 
The second factor that dramatically 
influenced South Africa‟s „quiet 
diplomacy‟ under Mbeki‟s 
administration is a corollary to the 
above factor, which is the 
globalisation politics. Globalisation 
is widely believed to be associated 
with faster economic growth, higher 
standards of living and expanded 
opportunities for technological 
development and cultural 
advancement for the participating 
countries. Therefore, there is thus 
this belief that, in the present 
international scenario, there is little 
alternative to globalisation (Chishti, 
2002).  
 
But there is a sense in which 
globalisation throws up a host of 
contradictions. According to Kunle 
Amuwo, globalization is a complex 
process and phenomenon of 
antinomies and dialectics: integrating 
and fragmenting world; uniformity 
and localization; increased material 
prosperity and deepening misery; 
homogenization and 
hegemonization. Globalization is 
nothing but a mixed grill. On the one 
hand, it has the potentiality of 
eroding national sovereignty of the 
weakest and poorest states, whilst 
widening the technological divide 
amongst states; on the other, it tends 
to provide an enabling environment 
for greater respects for human rights 
and gender equality. It is an 
economic orthodoxy that is failing 
the people, but enriching investors 
and big corporations. When Africa‟s 
political leaders rein into it, it is 
problematic; and when nation-states 
propose or seek to implement 
alternatives, they are pundits 
(Amuwo, 2004).  
 
In view of the two forces identified 
above, South Africa, under Mbeki 
fashioned her foreign policy to 
reflect aspects of the post-cold war 
politics and globalisation politics. 
Being aware of the increasing wave 
of pressure being exerted on nation-
states by the rampaging effects of 
these twin-factors, the onus rested on 
South Africa to protect the fledgling 
economies of most African states. 
And to do that successfully, she had 
to rely on the components of African 
solidarity and partnership in other to 
win the support and cooperation of 
African states. Whether the 
motivation for South Africa‟s foreign 
policy of constructive engagement 
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rests in her mercantilist tendency in 
Africa remains an issue for continual 
assessment by scholars of African 
development studies. But what is not 
in doubt remains the widening gulf 
of inequality fostered by the current 
international capitalist environment 
and the negative implications of this 
on the weak economies of smaller 
competitors like African states.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The thrust of this essay is the 
juxtaposition of the historical 
antecedents of the megaphone 
diplomatic foreign policy of Murtala-
Obasanjo era in the 1970s and the 
quiet diplomatic foreign policy 
approach of the Mbeki 
administration in the 2000s. The 
argument advanced here is that the 
combination of domestic factors and 
external forces dramatically 
influenced the choice of these 
approaches. Added is that the 
political and economic structures of 
the states involved and the personal 
philosophy of key actors connived to 
bring about the varying outcomes. 
More significantly, the reactions of 
the international community are 
repeatedly shaped by the 
international economic structure 
under which they operate. The 
implications of all of these issues for 
contemporary African states are not 
in doubt. The struggle for the soul of 
Africa is still un-ending and the 
gladiators are still un-changing.  
 
RECOMMENADTION  
Despite the differences in foreign 
policies of different African 
countries, we recommend that the 
post-colonial African states should 
endeavour to evolve foreign policies 
that will enhance the unity and the 
development of members of the 
African Union. Africa as a continent 
should transcend the stage of 
underdevelopment to becoming a 
leading continent with less internal 
conflicts and wars resulting to 
perennial appeal for Aid from the 
Western world. African states‟ 
foreign policies should not only 
develop the members of African 
Union (AU), it should be such that 
will solidify African relevance in 
world social eco-political systems; 
and not just as a means of 
developing the developed nations but 
asserting itself as a global player in 
international politics.  
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